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Humans should be able to think of computers as exten-
sions of their body, as craftsmen do with their tools.
Current security models, however, are too unlike those
used in human minds—for example, computers authen-
ticate users by challenging them to repeat a secret rather
than by continually observing the many subtle cues of-
fered by their appearance and behavior. We propose
three lines of research that can be combined to pro-
duce cognitive security on computers and other personal
devices: imprinting and continuously deployed multi-
modal biometrics, self-protection through virtualization
and trusted computing, and adjustably autonomous se-
curity.
1 Motivation and Overview
The best tools, in the hands of a skilled user, act as ex-
tensions of the human body. A craftsman makes a ham-
mer an extension of her arm, a driver makes a car an
extension of his body. We treat personal computing de-
vices this way as well, using them to extend our think-
ing, communication, and acting capabilities even when
we are not paying direct attention.
Trusting computers this way has its dangers. Unlike
most tools or body parts, a single bad interaction (with
a website or piece of code) can thoroughly compromise
a machine, giving control over its data, resources, and
operation to an adversary. The security community has
largely responded to this state of affairs by erecting bar-
riers between the user and the device—more passwords,
icons, dialog boxes, and warnings to increase their vig-
ilance. This vigilance comes at the expense of conve-
nience and productivity and yet is still brittle.
We propose that computers should act more like hu-
mans in their security decisions and characteristics. Hu-
man minds have evolved cognitive security: rich and
subtle mechanisms for handling trust and security in so-
cial interactions. For example, when presented with au-
thentication documents, human verifiers are trained to
examine the humans as well as the documents them-
selves. The personal interview, harnessing all our sub-
tle cognitive security traits, is still the gold standard for
determining malicious intentions in humans [15].
Currently, we suffer from cognitive dissonance from
trying both to treat computers as an extension of our-
selves and to be constantly vigilant of the ways in which
their security models are alien to those in our minds. If
we can build machines that manage their security more
like humans then we may be able to avoid some of the
damage caused by this cognitive dissonance.
Our focus in this paper is on personal devices that
serve one primary user, not servers or machines which
are primarily shared resources. While such shared re-
sources could also benefit from having better cognitive
security properties, we have chosen to start with per-
sonal devices because of the lesser complexity of hav-
ing one master and because edge devices are where the
primary security threats currently originate.
We propose advancing three lines of research that can
be combined to achieve cognitive security for personal
devices. First, imprinting and continuously deployed
multi-modal biometrics, allowing a device to reliably
recognize its owner. Second, self-protection through vir-
tualization and trusted computing, allowing a device to
protect itself while running untrusted applications. Fi-
nally, adjustably autonomous security, allowing a device
to make security decisions with user input for important
judgement calls. Progress in these areas will help pro-
duce devices that users can safely treat as extensions of
themselves.
2 Differentiating Between Users
To serve its owner well, a device must be able to reliably
differentiate between its owner and other users. Con-
ventional methods for doing this are brittle, however, so
we argue for two fundamental changes in how a device
determines whether its user is its owner. First, rather
than using a challenge/response protocol, we argue that
a device should recognize its user through ongoing mea-
surements of many streams of readily available biomet-
rics. Second, we argue that no user should ever be al-
lowed to set the identity of the owner; instead, a device
should imprint on the first user it has a sufficiently rich
interaction with, much like a baby bird imprints on the
first sufficiently mother-like object it encounters. These
two changes should allow a device to establish a durable
privileged relationship with its owner.
2.1 Recognizing the Owner
How can Abacus, a device, tell that it is interacting with
Alice, its owner? Conventional security designs gener-
ally use a challenge/response strategy. Under this ap-
proach, when Alice begins a session with Abacus, it
challenges her to prove her identity, often using secret
information such as a password. Once she has passed
this challenge, however, Abacus never challenges her
again that session, except perhaps after long periods
of idleness. Although the challenge may be arbitrar-
ily complex and difficult to fake—a password, biomet-
rics, hardware keys, etc—the pragmatics of human us-
age tend to erode this type of security:
• Challenges interrupt the natural use patterns of
many personal devices, such as PDAs and phones.
• Humans are bad at memorizing secrets: they of-
ten choose passwords that can be cracked by brute
force or data-mining, and frequently reuse the same
password on many different devices or services.
• Remote device use (e.g. calling one’s answering
machine to check for messages) precludes the use
of “physical” proofs like fingerprint scanning or
hardware keys.
Worse yet, challenge/response authentication is funda-
mentally vulnerable to theft. If you can duplicate the
bits that Alice will be challenged to produce, then you
can pretend to be her with impunity.
Humans do not normally recognize one another this
way: in most everyday interactions, we recognize peo-
ple by who they are and how they behave, rather than by
the secrets that they know. The cues we use for recog-
nition range from immediate and obvious, such as facial
structure, voice, and gait, to subtle and slowly emerg-
ing, such as fidgeting behavior and preferred topics of
conversation. Nearly all, however, are based on streams
of public information that are made available naturally
throughout an interaction. Moreover, most users already
view these sorts of biometrics as both acceptable and
trustworthy[7], particularly for a personal device where
privacy is not at stake.
2.1.1 Continuously Deployed Biometrics
We advocate a continuously deployed multi-modal ap-
proach, in which many different low-fidelity streams of
biometric information are combined to produce an ongo-
ing positive recognition of a user. With an optimistic and
ongoing recognition process, security can be stronger,
because attackers must impersonate Alice well enough
to satisfy many different cues throughout their interac-
tion with Abacus, and also less intrusive, because Alice
can gain privileges merely by interacting with Abacus.
There are potentially many cues available to help Aba-
cus recognize Alice. To name a few:
• Camera: invariant facial structure, height, pos-
ture, body shape, hair shape and color, complexion,
glasses and eye color, tics and motion patterns
• Microphone: voice tone, inflection, pattern of
speech and pauses
• Button Array (e.g. keyboard, phone keypad): typ-
ing speed, pause patterns
• Pointing Device (e.g. mouse, PDA stylus): smooth-
ness of arc, idle/wander patterns, speed of traverse,
duration and frequency of clicks
• Accelerometer: walking speed, changes in posture
• Use Patterns: music choice, favorite web destina-
tions, choice of words and phrasing, patterns of use
and idleness, preferences for button vs. pointer in-
put, preferred times of day
• Other Sensors: body temperature, fingerprints, con-
ductivity
Alone, none of these cues is likely to even approach
either the consistency or reliability of a strong password.
As an aggregate, however, they may out-perform chal-
lenge/response approaches.
Although many devices will have only a subset of
these sensors, there are enough cues available that any
large subset ought to provide enough information for
a good recognition signal. For example, with 20 cues,
each with an independent 20% error rate, a 2/3 vote has
only a 1 in 500,000 chance of producing an incorrect
decision.
The machine-learning subfield of ensemble
learning[9] is explicitly focused on the problem of
building strong classifiers from many weak classifiers,
and has produced algorithms such as AdaBoost[4]
that should be easily applicable to the problem of
combining cues to provide good security while never
denying Alice access to her own device. Existing work
in multi-modal biometrics (e.g. [11], [3]) has already
shown that machine learning can be used to fuse data
sources and boost the efficacy of person recognition.
In a continuously deployed multi-modal approach, we
simply greatly multiply the number of sources and the
time-frame over which they are considered.
Because cues are based on readily available informa-
tion, the goal of a cue recognition system cannot be per-
fect security. It will always be possible for a sufficiently
determined attacker to study Alice thoroughly enough
and invest enough time and effort in counterfeiting to
fool Abacus. Rather, the goal of cue recognition is to
make the cost of doing so high enough that an attacker
will almost always prefer a different approach: even if
the attacker knows how Abacus recognizes Alice, sus-
taining an appropriate ensemble of cues is likely to be
difficult.
2.1.2 Rich and Poor Cue Availability
When Alice and Abacus are physically co-located, the
majority of cues are likely to be readily available. In a
situation of this sort, the evidence that Abacus is inter-
acting with Alice is likely to be overwhelming. As such,
these periods of rich cue availability are ideal sources of
training data, which Abacus can use to gradually adjust
its model to reflect how Alice herself changes over time.
If Alice is interacting with Abacus remotely, how-
ever, most of the cues will not be available. If Alice
called Abacus from an ordinary phone to get her mes-
sages, for example, Abacus would have only her voice,
tones produced by button presses, and her use patterns
to judge her identity. When the interaction between Al-
ice and Abacus is short and few cues are available, it
may be advisable to also use a password or similar chal-
lenge/response method.
2.2 Imprinting Abacus on Alice
Currently, devices are designed so that a sufficiently
privileged user can easily change anything on the ma-
chine, including how it recognizes Alice. The only way
to avoid this is to have Abacus’ recognition of Alice be
immutable.
There is a metaphorical similarity here to the psycho-
logical notion of imprinting. Many animals go through
critical periods where they rapidly learn to recognize a
special stimulus. Imprinted relationships are extremely
durable, often lasting a lifetime. Geese, for example, im-
print on first suitable moving object they see shortly after
hatching, and will ever after treat it as their parent[8].
Likewise, when Abacus has its first long and cue-rich
encounter with Alice, we argue that it should imprint on
her. During that first encounter, it should learn to rec-
ognize Alice in as many different ways as possible, fix-
ing her characteristics in a protected memory where not
even Alice herself can modify it. Alice can thus trust that
even a successful attack on Abacus will not compromise
its relationship with her.
2.2.1 Loans and Sales
Imprinting need not make it any more difficult for Alice
to loan out Abacus to her friends. If Abacus implements
a reasonably fine-grained access control system, then it
can adjust the privileges in real-time based on its ability
to recognize its current user.
Transferring ownership, on the other hand, is a major
shift, since only Abacus has access to its imprinting data.
The new owner, Bob will not want an Abacus whose
primary loyalty is to Alice rather than to him, so Aba-
cus must re-imprint. Alice, meanwhile, will not want
an Abacus that can re-imprint while carrying her private
information. The only way out of this dilemma is for a
transfer of ownership to involve a “death and rebirth”—
Abacus must reinitialize itself completely, destroying
any data that Alice has on it, then imprint freshly on
Bob. The difficulty of causing device death will likely
depend on the type of device.
3 An Architecture for Machine Integrity
We envision Abacus as obedient to Alice’s interests in
an autonomic sense. Just as Alice’s heart keeps beat-
ing even when she’s sleeping, or not paying attention, or
when she’s so emotionally distraught that she thinks it
is broken, so too should Abacus require minimal action
from Alice to work. Currently it is just too easy for ma-
chines to be compromised for them to be trusted in this
way.
Human security has some strong advantages over that
of machines. Our human minds are basically inviolable;
while it is easy to guess the gist of what someone is
thinking or manipulate another person into doing what
you want, it is impossible to actually read another per-
son’s mind or control their will. In contrast, comput-
ers are completely at the mercy of their users and appli-
cation programming, making them vulnerable to attack
and compromise by any rogue user, application, or re-
mote exploit.
In humans, this security is effected by three features:
(1) physical security in the form of the skull, the blood-
brain barrier and limited access and inputs, (2) isolation
of different regions of the brain and the ability of cer-
tain regions to examine and reflect upon the activity and
thoughts of other regions and (3) a complex cognitive
security system that acts to protect our secrets and self-
control and manage relationships with other humans.
We cannot replicate this security entirely in Abacus, but
we can seek to gain some of its properties strengthening
integrity, isolation, and secure decision-making skills in
machines.
The problem is actually harder for Abacus than for
humans because Abacus must be capable of protecting
its integrity from Alice while still obeying her wishes.
Alice will want to run the dubious JavaScript applica-
tion and Abacus has to let her, or else she will greatly
resent the intrusion. The key is to recognize that it is a
risky or untrusted program and find a way to run it safely
while still isolating the Abacus core and protecting the
integrity of it and other critical data and applications.
Building the kind of trustworthy agent devices we en-
vision requires some architectural support. Develop-
ments in trusted computing, virtualization, and instru-
mentation provide a strong basis for the development of
more sophisticated security models. While there may be
other ways to provide the needed security, this combina-
tion is already an active area of research (sHype, Xense,
etc) [2].
Such an architecture is illustrated in Figure 1. The
trusted computing base—the software which must be
vulnerability-free to protect the system—is shown in
yellow. The core of the system is protected by a trusted
platform module (TPM) that protects key material and
ensures the integrity of the virtual machine monitor
(VMM) above it. The security manager, verified by the
VMM below it, runs in a virtual machine that manages
the rest of the VMs. Abacus can spawn virtual machines
to run untrusted code in isolation and uses instrumenta-
tion to detect malicious actions on the part of this code.
Without virtualization, trusted computing can attest to
specific software configuration, but such systems are not
easily changed and brittle; there is no way to run un-
trustworthy code. Virtualization alone is not enough ei-
ther. Without trusted hardware, there is no root of trust
to build the system on: the VMM could be resting on top
of a stealthy root kit like Blue Pill[12].
While such architectures have been limited to PCs, we
also envision security managers running on other per-
sonal devices, like phones and PDAs. Increasing num-
bers of phones are running full-scale operating systems,
and virtualization is becoming more and more efficient
and lightweight. The continuing march of Moore’s law
will also make more layered approaches to security more
feasible long term.
3.1 Trusted Computing
Trusted computing refers to certain hardware additions
to the platform, including a secure co-processor that al-
lows for (1) secure storage and memory and (2) attesta-
tion: the ability of running code to prove that it is run-
ning in some specific environment [16]. One of the key
benefits of using trusted computing is the isolation from
attacks it provides. Key material can be stored securely
and maintain security even in the event of software com-
promise. Attestation by the secure core can be used to
maintain the integrity of software executing on the ma-
chine (for example a VMM) and bootstrap more com-
plex security layers in software from there.
Trusted computing, as expressed in the initiatives
of the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) [1] formerly
known as TCPA, and the Microsoft Next Generation Se-
cure Computing Base (NGSCB, formerly known as Pal-
ladium) has been widely criticized for its potential to be
used for unpopular DRM and ability to create software
lock-in. However, most of these criticisms can be ad-
dressed by allowing owner override of the trusted plat-
form’s functions [14].
Trusted computing enables secure boot by allowing
each level of the machine (from bios and firmware up
through the operating system and applications) to be
measured and then stored as a hash on the TPM. These
measurements are checked before control is transferred
Figure 1: An illustration of the architecture for Abacus.
The trusted computing base (TPM, VMM, and security
manager) is shown in yellow. The rest of the hardware is
untrusted, as are the other virtual machines for running
applications.
to the next level and can be used to ensure that security-
critical code is not maliciously altered [1]. Bootstrap-
ping trust using a secure processor alone is quite brit-
tle; any time the software or hardware configuration
changes, the trust chain must be built anew. Virtualiza-
tion provides a way to add additional flexibility and iso-
lation using software. This is what NGSCB was trying
to do with the nexus “secure right side” and the “inse-
cure left side” on Windows.
3.2 Virtualization
Virtualization is the process of representing hardware re-
sources abstractly in software. In its most extreme incar-
nation, emulation, all hardware is abstracted. There are
also lightweight versions that only virtualize key system
calls or drivers. While virtualization is most well-known
for allowing multiple operating systems to run on the
same machine, its security benefits are primarily gained
by isolating pieces of software from each other. When
the hardware (and some software) is abstracted, software
running at different levels of trust can each be run on
their own virtual machine. Different virtual machines
are managed by a virtual machine monitor (VMM). If
the VMM is secure (a large assumption but more plau-
sible than operating system security) then each of these
sets of software will execute in isolation, and a compro-
mise in one VM will not affect the others or the VMM.
The basic architecture is illustrated in Figure 1. The
hardware contains a trusted platform module, that can
be accessed by a virtual machine monitor that manages
a number of virtual machines. The security management
software will be run on a virtual machine on top of the
VMM, so that the VMM can remain simpler and more
likely to be bug-free. Nonetheless, the security man-
ager will still be a part of the trusted computing base and
need to be designed carefully, to avoid failures such as
leaking biometric information about Alice or providing
TPM owner override to an imposter. The security man-
ager will have the ability to spawn virtual machines for
the purpose of running applications on them and also for
the purpose of testing the integrity of other applications
and virtual machines. For instance, it is often possible
to detect the presence of malicious code by running it
in an instrumented virtual machine and taking note of
suspicious actions [10]. In addition, root kits can often
be detected by reconstructing the semantic view of the
operating system from the virtual state in the VM in an-
other VM and then comparing the outputs [6].
With good virtualization technology, it should be pos-
sible for much everyday activity to be handled safely
by confining untrustworthy code to isolated virtual ma-
chines. It is important, however, that all these virtual
machines have their I/O fused together to give Alice a
seamless experience, rather than forcing her to navigate
between them.
4 Adjustably Autonomous Security
If Alice understood what Abacus was being asked to do
by the programs that she is running on it, she would usu-
ally be able to make good judgments about what behav-
iors are suspicious. For example, if Alice runs a program
to send greeting cards to her friends, she would be happy
to see it send those cards, upset if it tried to modify her
browser, upset if it sent a list of her contacts or ads for
Viagra to some random address, and might allow it to
send its creator email with statistics on how many cards
had been created.
Notice that these scenarios place us on the horns of
a dilemma. On the one hand, these scenarios cannot be
distinguished by what resources are involved, only by
the semantic content of their usage, and we cannot ex-
pect Abacus to differentiate between them without help
from Alice. On the other hand, computers do so many
things so rapidly that asking Alice for many judgment
calls will quickly overwhelm her and annoy her into dis-
abling security.
What we need is a way for Abacus to filter and sum-
marize its behavior so that Alice is only asked to make
a few relevant judgment calls. For Alice to be able to
rely on Abacus’ judgment about what decisions need
her input, Abacus needs to be able to judge how valu-
able and private a piece of information is, know what
Alice is expecting a program to do, know what types of
program behavior are worthy of suspicion, and simulate
Alice’s judgment so that it does not pester her when the
answer should be obvious. Although this is an unsolved
problem, closely related problems are being studied in
other domains, such as collaborative planning[13] and
adjustable autonomy[5].
Any successful system will need to begin with a built-
in knowledge base (containing facts like “money is valu-
able” and “sending spam is bad”), which is then mod-
ified as it interacts with Alice. Abacus will need a
good model of how humans think about security so that
it can infer Alice’s likely judgments about new situa-
tions based on her reactions to previous situations. The
same behavioral information used to recognize Alice
might enrich this learning process as well—for exam-
ple, guessing that information that causes stress in Alice
is likely to be important to her.
Knowing what behaviors are suspicious is likely to be
a harder problem and involve getting descriptions of pro-
gram behaviors from some third party. Likely, Abacus
will need some trust anchors that can provide machine-
readable security advisories.
Finally, there needs to be careful user interface design
that allows Abacus to give Alice information about the
judgments that it is making, such that she can notice and
react to them appropriately without interfering with her
normal usage.
5 Conclusion
Cognitive security leads to better overall security be-
cause of the better match between a personal device
and its user. This can be achieved by combining three
lines of research: trusted computing and virtualization
to protect the integrity of the device, imprinting with
continuously deployed multi-modal biometrics to allow
the device to recognize its owner, and human-like se-
curity models to enable responsible decision-making by
the device. The greatest challenge is the last: human-like
threat perception and response is a problem of poten-
tially limitless complexity, and adversaries will exploit
any systematic flaw in the design. Even a partial solu-
tion, however, may be effective enough to fundamentally
change the trust relationship between users and their de-
vices.
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